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POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN 
THE USSR AND JAPAN: 
A TENTATIVE COMPARISONキ
Shugo Minagawa 
One might expect the conduct of bureaucracies of modern industrial 
countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union to be governed by the 
norms of rationality， anonimity， and universalism. Insecurity， which is 
believed to be one of the causes of c1ientelism， isnot greatly felt by the 
officials of these countries who in a material sense enjoy considerable 
privi1eges at least whi1e they are in office (although one must admit 
that in the USSR officials until recently were highly insecure since it 
was easy to be deprived of office). Yet， ithas been widely noted that 
informal alignments based on interpersonal commitments are one of 
the characteristics of both the Japanese and the Soviet bureaucracies. 
This paper seeks to establish a few common and distinctive features 
of the ‘physiology' of Soviet and Japanese political c1ientelism. That 
is to say， itattempts to identify the reasons for the development of 
c1ientelism， how it works and what part it plays in the operation of 
the system as a whole. One of the limitations of comparable studies 
of clientelism in this paper is that the overall political systems within 
which clientelism operates in the two countries differ greatly. Largely 
because of this， 1 propose to limit my consideration of Japanese clien-
telism mainly to the government bureaucracy， that part of the Japanese 
* This paper was original1y prepared for presentation at the Second World 
Congress for Soviet and East European Studies (30 September-4 Octoder， 
1980， Garmisch-Partenkirchen， West Germany). 
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system presenting the broadest basis of comparison with the Soviet 
system as a whole. 
Since the audience to which this paper is primarily addressed wiIl 
generaIly have some famiIiarity with case material iIlustrative of 
poIitical cIienteIism in the USSR， but be less familiar with comparable 
phenomena in ]apan， itwilI be useful， inorder to provide some basis 
for comparison， to look cIosely at a particular ]apanese case. This 
appears to be entirely typical， albeit an unusualIy welI-documented one. 
The story makes for rather compIicated reading， but it is weIl to 
remind ourselves that cIienteIist poIitics is often very compIicated， and 
it has the merit of ilIusttating in a concrete way most of the general 
features of ]apanese cIientelist behaviour to be discussed later. For a 
quick first reading of the paper， the reader may prefer to proceed 
direct to page 279， where the general analysis commences. 
1 JAPANESE CASE 
This case concerns‘S' (Shigeru SAHASHI) who served in the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) from April 1937 
to April 1967. He started his career in the Engineering Bureau， then 
advanced by moving around a number of bureaus (the so-calIed ‘spiral 
advancement'): General Affairs Bureau， Textile Bureau， Sendai Local 
Office， Coal Industry Bureau， Secretariat， Heavy Industry Bureau， En-
terprise Bureau， and the Patent Agency. He retired as (administrative) 
Vice司Ministerof MITI -the highest civil service post in the Ministry 
-in April 1967. 
守 'searly career had suffered many twists and turns because of 
his uncompromising personaIity. When he was the Chief of the Paper 
Industry Section in Textile Bureau， the Ministry's employees union， 1
which was headed by ‘S'， was suppressed by the Director of the Secre-
tariat， NAGAYAMA. 'S' had cIashed over union issues with NAGAYA-
MA several times. 'S' was eventualIy demoted by NAGAYAMA and 
transferred to the Sendai Local Office of the Ministry. His cIienteIist 
activities had reaIIy started when he became Chief of the Personnel 
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Section in the Secretariat in July 1954. He served in this office for 
two terms， til July 1957. There are three sections in the Secretariat: 
the Personnel (literally secretarial activiti巴s)，General Affairs， and 
Accounting sections. Those heading the Personnel Section and the 
General Affairs Section， inparticular， enjoyed the highest status of al 
incumbents of the 200 or so posts at section-chief level in MITI (in-
cluding its extra，-ministerial offices)， and so had better chances of 
becoming bureau chiefs. (There are seven Bureaus and three extra‘ 
ministerial Bureaus， and the Director of Secretariat also has Bureau 
Chief rank. Again， asin the case of section chiefs， not al bureau chiefs 
have equal status. The Chief of the Enterprise Bureau， for example， 
had better chances to become Vice Minister for the Ministry.) The 
main areas of responsibility of the General Affairs Section is to work 
out programmes for the general management and policy coordination of 
the Ministry. The Personnel Section is responsible for such matters as 
recruitment， dismissal， advancement， marriage arrangements， post-
retirement jobs， etc. The three sections in the Secretariat operate 
under the direction of a Director. As the Secretariat deals with con-
fidential matters of the Ministry， such as policy adjustments， personnel 
matters and the Ministry's budget， the Vice-Minister chooses his right-
hand man as its Director. Likewise， the latter usually appoints his 
trusted followers as its section chiefs. The Vice-Minister was at that 
time ISHIHARA， and the Director of the Secretariat was MATSUO. 
The Chief of the General Affairs Section in the Secretariat was '1' 
(Zenei IMAI) who had been ‘S' 's chief rival right through his career 
in the Ministry， although they shared the same patron. 
The Chief of the Personnel Section can by no means act solely on 
his own initiative， although he is assigned to implement the Ministry's 
day-to-day personnel policy. Probably， he has greater latitude to act 
on personneI changes below the section-chief Ievel. Above that leveI， 
however， he is more likely to receive instructions from the Director 
of the Secretariat， the Iatter having sought the opinion of the Vice-
Minister or the 'Tuesday Club' (formed by retired high-Ievel officials 
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of MITI). But if the section chief happens to have an uncompromising 
personality and a vision of future personnel policy such as‘S' had， and 
provided the Director gives him his blessing， the section chief can 
occupy a pivotal position in personnel management. 
It should be noted that about the year 1954， the ]apanese economy 
passed from the period of post-war recovery to that of expansion. 
The first postwar prosperity period started in 1955. Ever since ]apan 
was admitted into the I.M.F. and the world Bank in 1952， the ]apanese 
government had been under constant pressure to become an I.M.F. 
Article Eight Country， i. e. to establish an open economic system Iike 
those of other developed countries. ‘S' appears to have been seriously 
concerned about the competitiveness of ]apanese industries in an open 
economic system， and therefore worked out a personnel policy to cope 
with this contingency. He succeeded in recruiting 19 very able graduates 
out of 200 successful candidates whom he interviewed personal1y.‘S' 
also took note of the intellectual ability of‘Z' (Yoshihiko MOROZUMI-
recruited in 1943) who then held the position of research counsellor in 
the Secretariat. ‘Z' had a high reputation in the Ministry for his out-
standing logical mind. In order to facilitate ‘Z' 's objective of studying 
the French system of mixed economy， 'S' sent him to Paris， where he 
was attached to the ]apanese Embassy as a trade attache.‘S' had also 
established very close personal bonds with 'C' (Chihaya KA WADE-
recrui ted in 1939)，‘H' (Hideyuki KAWAHARA-recruited in 1941) and 
‘Y' (Yukio MIYAKE recruited in 1943). 'C' was at that time the Chief 
of the First Section of the Enterprise Bureau， and ‘Y' the Chief of its 
Second Section. The post of first section chief， whose future career 
prospects are usually bright， isusually given to one of those promising 
officials whose creative minds are tested and in constant demand in the 
Ministry.‘H' was then the Minister's secretary in the Secretariat. 'C'， 
‘H' and ‘Y' al1， if not ‘Z'， shared the same temperament and aspirations 
as their patron，‘S'. 
When守 waspromoted to be Deputy Chief and later Chief of the 
Heauy Industry Bureau，‘C' succeeded to 'S' 's previous post， as Chief 
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of the Personnel Section in the Secretariat， and a little later 'C' be-
came‘S' 's deputy in the Heavy Industry Bureau， while ‘Y' became the 
Minister's secretary in the Secretariat. 
When ‘S' became the Chief of the Enterprise Bureau， he succeeded 
in placing his key followers in strategic positions so as to mobilize 
them to his own ends.‘H' became the counsellor of the planning section 
in the Secretariat， and ‘0' (Kenzo OTOTAKE-recruited in 1941， another 
of‘S' 's loyal followers) became the Chief of General Affairs Section 
in th巴Secretariat.‘Z'was hastily recalled from Paris to head the First 
Section of the Enterprise Bureau， which position had been kept vacant 
by官 fortwo months -a very unusual occlirrence in ]apanese govern-
mental personnel management.‘Y' was also chosen to head the Industrial 
Funds Section in the Enterprise Bureau.‘S' 's clientelist machine， who 
became known as the ‘Nationalists'， moved in ful swing to materialize 
their patron's policy object: to reinforce domestic industries in anti-
cipation of the impending change in ]apan's economic situation. 
‘S' 's clientelist machine made such determined efforts in the 
Ministry that a countermove by the so-called ‘Internationalists' was 
made. The internationalist group was gradually formed around '1' (the 
Chief of the International Trade Bureau) who made his career largely 
in the field of international trade. It is said that their countermove 
was promoted not so much by the policy issue， as by 官、 uncompro・
mising personality and his obvious clientelist activities. The ‘Inter-
nationalists'， moved carefully， however， to counterbalance官 'sweight 
in the Ministry. ‘S' had to concede to one of '1' 's followers，‘J' (Yo・
shihisa O]IMI-recruited in 1941)， though unlike '1' whose career had 
largely been made in the field of domestic industry but stil shared the 
same temperam巴ntas '1'. 'J' was to head the newly created research 
section on the restructuring of industry in the Secretariat. This section 
had to enquire into which of the country's industries would be reinforced 
by law. Such an enquiry could be expected to contribute significantly 
in the process of drafting and realizing any related legislation. 
The Ministry duly drafted a bil on‘Temporary Measures for the 
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Promotion of Specified Industries'. It was original1y drafted by two 
junior officials (KONAGA and UCHIDA -both of them ‘S' 's followers) 
in the Heavy Industry Bureau. This initial draft was designed to support 
those weak industries based on classified-industry. When 'Z' came back 
from Paris， however， he revised it by introducing a more systematic 
approach， that is， by linking weak industries laterally so that al weak 
industries could be reinforced in a harmonious and synchronized way. 
The bil went before the Diet for approval three times， and although 
certain amendments were made each time， itwas never passed. Needless 
to say‘S' and his followers in the Ministry mobilized al1 available 
forces inc1uding their social networks in order to influence interested 
parties， such as the Fair Trade Commission and in particular financial 
and industrial circles. But to no avail， they turned it down. Moreover， 
the ruling party had shown very litle enthusiasm. It was a bil without 
political sponsors. 
‘S' aggrieved at the failure of his efforts， placed the responsibility 
partly on the Minister's (then Hajime FUKUDA-Ohno faction， LDP) 
lukewarm support for the bill. Unfortunately， for him this was just the 
time when the new Vice-Minister was to be named as successor to the 
retiring Vice-Minister， MATSUO. In MITI， itwas almost taken for 
granted that the Chief of the Enterprise Bureau (now ‘S') would succeed 
the retiring Vice-Minister. Despite repeated warnings from MAT8UO， 
however， the Minister ignored al precedents， and named ‘S' 's chief 
rival 'I' as successor to the retiring MA TSUO. We do not know whether 
the ‘Internationalists' engaged in any campaign behind the scenes against 
the bil and against 'S' personally. '8' was now demoted to the post of 
Director of the Patent Agency， an extra-ministerial office of MITI. 
Presumably， the Minister decided on his demotion for two reasons:官、opencriticism of himself and his unconventional behaviour in not 
reciprocating favours.2 Although ‘8' was removed from the centre of 
power in the Ministry， some of his followers were able to control the 
nerve system of the Ministry. For instance，‘C' became the Director 
of the Secretariat，‘H' became the Chief of the Personnel Section and 
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‘Y' became the Chief of the General Affairs Section in the Secretariat. 
In the meantime， the former Vice-Ministers， ISHIHARA (retired 
in 1957， then became Inspector of the Tokyo Electric Power Co.) and 
TOKUNAGA (retired in 1961， and became Deputy President of the 
Japan Steel Corporation) in particular， paved the way to reinstate ‘S' 
as Vice-Minister， by apologizing to the Ohno faction for ‘S' 's past 
misbehaviour. When a Cabinet reshuffle took place in October 1964， 
he was finally made Vice-Minister of the Ministry. ‘S' promptly ap-
pointed one of his trusted followers，‘H'， as Director of the Secret-
ariat. 'C' also became the Chief of the Heavy Industry Bureau， but of 
the Enterprise Bureau which was the first runner position for becoming 
the Vice-Minister and which was then occupied by SHIMADA who 
would have become the Vice-Minister if守 hadnot made a comeback. 
A year and a half later， however 守 dramaticallydecided abruptly to 
terminat巴histenure， out of deep grief at the sudden death of ‘H'. 
The Minister， MIKI， then had to appoint a successor to‘S' from 
among three contenders， namely， SHIMADA (Chief of the Enterprise 
Bureau-recruited in 1939)， 'C' (‘S'‘s follower)， and KURAHAHI 
(Director of the Patent Agency-recruited in 1938; most inopportunely， 
his secret political maneuvering with the Ohno faction was now 
revealed). In the end， with a view to restoring harmonious human 
relations in the Ministry， MIKI decided to appoint a neutral， non-
contested man，‘M' (YAMAMOTO-recruited in 1939) as守、 successor.
This outcome would scarcely have been anticipated by ‘S' who probably 
had in mind the following line of succession by his trusted followers: 
he would be succeeded first by 'C' and then by 'H' and eventual1y by 
‘Y'. Now that 'C' was out of the competition and ‘H' had passed away， 
such a scenario became irrelevant. 
The new Vice-Minister ‘M'， who succe巴ded守， was not altogether 
neutra1. Much of his career in the Ministry had been associated with 
the field of international trade. Indeed， atone time， he was the deputy 
to the then Bureau Chief of the International Trade Bureau，‘I'，‘S' 's 
chief ri va1.‘M' chose 'J' as his right-hand man， the Director of the 
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Secretariat. It seems that the reigning Vice-Minister usually has a 
right to name the Director of the Secretariat. The relations between 
the Vice-Minister and the Director， however， are usually delicate， 
complex and sometimes tenuous. If the Vice-Minister does not have a 
domineering personality， the Director can fully realise his very large 
formal responsibilities. It is thus a combination of the personality of 
both， and th巴d巴greeof trust and affective ties between the two， that 
determine their relations. In 'J' 's case， he seems to have acted on 
personnel matters a great deal on his own. He mobilized able officials 
with long overseas trade exper匂nce，offering them important non-
international trade posts. For instance， KOMATSU who returned from 
West Germany was promoted to be Chief of the General Affairs 
Section in the Secretariat， W ADA who returned from Canada became 
Chief of the Industrial Machine Section in the Heavy Industry Bureau， 
and MASUDA who returnedd from Belgium became Chief of the Iron 
and Steel Affairs Section in the Heavy Industry Bureau. By and large， 
it has been the practice of the Japanese government bureaucracy to 
produce competent generalists， i.e. officials with experience in varied 
types of work and in various fields. In MITI， however， there had been 
a strong tendency for officials who had undergone international trade 
apprenticeship abroad to be reassigned to comparable policy positions 
in the central office. Until then， the ‘Internationalists' had been rega-
rded as not fit to hold the Vic巴-Ministership， which should b巴 occupicd
by a man commanding a profound knowledge in the administration of 
domestic industri巴s. Indeed， itwas 'J' who established firmly the 
present routinization of the line of succession to the Vice -Ministership : 
Director of the Secretariat -Chief of the International Trade Policy 
Bureau (formerly the International Trade Bureau) -Chief of the 
Industrial Policy Bureau (form巴rlythe Enterprise Bureau) ー Vice-
Minister. The routinization not only blurr巴dthe distinction between 
the‘Nationalists' and‘Internationalists'， but also minimized political 
interference in the personnel affairs of the Ministry. Previously， there 
had been a loosely routinized path from the Enterprise Bureau Chief 
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to the Vice-Minister. But this line of succession was too short， inviting 
occasional political interference as in the case of ‘S'. 
It is not certain， however， ifthe routinization of the line of suc-
cession has lessened c1ientelist activities. The fate of routinization is 
always susceptible to unforeseen contingenci巴ssuch as sudden death or 
i1 health or ear1y retirement of the heir apparent， thus leaving room 
for c1ientelist manoeuvering. Whether this routinization was devised 
with intent to suppress the advancement of‘S' 's fol1owers， we do not 
know. The fact is that none of ‘S' 's fol1owers ever found a place in 
the Vice-Ministership， which has been taken over by the old ‘Inter-
nationalists'. The possible exception to this is ‘Z' who eventual1y 
reached the Vice-Ministership. Earlier ‘Z' had been the Director of 
the Secretariat and he was not particularly keen on promoting ‘S' 's 
fol1owers. He may in fact have acted in that way out of a realization 
that the nature of the contemporary national economic system which 
was affected by the international economic environment and Japan‘s 
growing important plac巴 ininternational trade required structural 
changes inc1uding personnel changes in the government industrial admi-
nistration. It is said， however， that‘Z'， though his professional com・
petence was highly regarded by ‘S'， had never established close personal 
bonds wi th him. Indeed，守 wasreported to have made the ironical 
remark some time after his retirement: ‘When I happen to meet ‘Z' 
occasional1y， he says ostensibly I am the one who brought him in to 
a sunny place' (italics added).3 
The case cited above is by no means an isolated one in Japanese 
government bureaucracy. Similar cases have been reported in other 
Ministries. As mentioned earlier， however， unlike other similar cases， 
i t iswel1 documented by a number of observers.4 As the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry was a litle more dynamic than other 
Ministries， the policy issue also came to the fore at a time of uncer-
tainty of Japan's economic situation and on this， combined with the 
personality of‘S'， a man who did not mince matters， combined to bring 
the case to the surface， to the good fortune of outside observers. 
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n CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN 
THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN 
Despite the fact that there exist， albeit on a journalistic level， 
numerous descriptions of ]apanese clientelist activities， litle attempt 
has been made to examine such questions as the causation of clientelist 
behaviour， its system of membership and durability， and the effects of 
clientelism on the ]apanese political system. By contrast， several 
students of Soviet politics have carried out serious studies aiming to 
clarify such questions. With reference to the ‘physiology' of both Soviet 
and ]apanese political clientelism， however， very few empirical exami-
nations have yet been undertaken. Comparative examination of these 
aspects must therefore remain a tentative exercise at this present time. 
More substantial efforts of comparison will only be possible after more 
extensive empirical findings are available. 
1. CAUSATION OF CLIENTELIST BEHA VIOUR 
A patron-client relationship is， according to Carl H. Land's defi-
ninition，5 ‘a vertical dyadic alliance'， an alliance between two， persons 
of unequal status， power or resources each of whom finds it useful to 
have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself. It may be 
almost impossible to pinpoint the exact reasons as to why two in-
dividuals form a patron-client relationship; yet with the limited available 
material on the subject， we may nevertheless roughly divide the in-
dividuals' motivations into two categories， which may be termed func-
tional and non-functioal. The manifestations of functional motivation 
may best be observed in the political process operating in the main 
areas of clientelist activities， namely， recruitment， advancement， post-
retirement security， and policy involvement. It would be a mistake， 
however， to explain the norms and incentives for clientage relationship 
in purely functional terms. To approximate an individuals' ful moti-
vations， one needs to examine the contexts of clientelism which include 
also non-fuctional components of a structural， cultural and environ-
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mental kind. 
Functional M otivation 
1) Recruitment and advancement. Speaking of clientelist activity， 
Keith Legg says，6‘nowhere is this clearer than in the area of recruit-
ment and advancement'. ]apan and the Soviet Union are no exception 
to this. 
In ]apanese government bureaucracy， we saw this in the case hi-
story from MITI， where the Chief of the Personnel Section is respon-
sible for recruiting 20 to 30 trainees for higher-level positions every 
year.7 The criteria for the recruitment of trainees in ]apan is on the 
whole conservative and formal. The energetic recruiting efforts shown 
by‘S' when he was Chief of the Personnel Section is somewhat ex-
ceptional， although one can certainly point to other cases where persons 
who have passed the special higher examination decide to enter a 
Ministry as a result of much persuasion or personal connections. 
Nonetheless， itis not likely that the trainees establish affective rela-
tionships with particular seniors right from the beginning. The recruits 
often undergo a training period of about six years， learning the work 
of some particular Ministry. Take the Ministry of Finance， for in-
stance， where the trainees， intheir first year， will be dispersed through 
the planning and research groups of the General Affairs Section in 
each Bureau or in the Personnel Section or Archives and Documents 
Section in the Secretariat in order to obtain some basic familiarity 
with the Ministry. In their second year， the trainees will usually be 
sent to local revenue offices to learn the actual taxation system on 
the SpOt. In their third year， they may take an academic course in 
economic theory given either at the Ministry or at an academic in-
stitution abroad. In their fourth and fifth year， they will be trained 
under some assistant section chief or ful section chief. In the sixth 
year， as a final training ground， they will be posted to various local 
revenue offices again， but this time as superintendent. The above-
mentioned training period is usually given to al recruits. It helps to 
、 、 ， ，???， ? 、
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cultivate in the recruits a sense of identity with the Ministry. After 
this training period， they will ordinarily be shifted from one section 
to another every two or three years. The main purpose of this spiral 
career mobility is said to be the ideal of producing generalists rather 
than specialists， and also to ward off sectionalism.8 
Almost al recruits reach the position of section chief. By the 
time a junior becomes a section chief， he will probably have established 
particularly good relationships with certain senior officials. As we 
have noted earlier， not al section chiefs enjoy equal status in the 
Ministry. Hierarchy exists in the Ministry not only vertically but also 
laterally. Career mobility above assistant section chief is in most 
cases a matter of moving sideways. The important question is therefore 
to which post one is assigned， whether it is as section chief or Bureau 
Chief， given the fact， also， that the line of succession has been routinized 
in almost al the Ministries. Moreover， senior posts above section chief 
level are so scarce that their tenure becomes uncertain. As a rule of 
seniority is strictly applied in career mobility， itfollows that if an 
official remains， without being able to advance himself further， inone 
position， during a normal rotating period， he then becomes a bottleneck 
for the juniors who wish to advance their careers. In such a case， he 
wi1l usually be advised by his senior to retire at an earlier age rather 
than at the customary retiring age of 5. To avoid such a contingency， 
an official at section chief level may search for a patron powerful 
enough to guard his tenure. On the other hand， when an official becomes 
Bureau Chief， he is so concerned with policy issues that he is in a 
position to recommend those juniors who are close to him for key 
positions. We have already observed that when ‘S' moved from chief 
of one bureau to chief of another he took with him some of his men 
or posted them in strategic positions. It is the Director of the Sec-
retariat， and to a lesser extent the Chief of the Personnel Section， 
(although his main function is to maintain harmony and solidarity within 
the Ministry)， who is structurally located to establish clientelist rela-
tionships with juniors whom he has earmarked during or after the 
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training period. 
The practice of recruiting able juniors as faction members is not 
a recent phenomenon. In the Imperial ]apanese Army during the Meiji 
era， for instance， there were the Satsuma and Choshu domain cliques. 
As the army machine began to be concerned with complex policy issues 
under a rapidly changing international environment， each clique had to 
recruit men of ability， searching beyond the traditional clique boundaries.9 
Post-retirement jobs do not in al cases constitute advancement 
for senior officials， but it is one of their major concerns， (probably as 
great as advancement within the Ministry itself). When a senior official 
retires from the Ministry， its Secretariat wi1l usually provid巴himwith 
an appropriate post-retirement job. If he were asked to retire under 
pressure from above， and declined to do so， then the Secretariat would 
be very reluctant to provide him the best available job upon his eventual 
retirement. In 1976， for instance， wh巴nHA Y ASHI (at that time Chief 
of the Industrial Environment Bureau of MITI， recruited in 1947) 
refused to retire， the Secretariat asked instead another Bureau Chief， 
MORIGUCHI (Chief of Industrial Information Bureau of MITI， recruited 
in 1947) to retire， and MORIGUCHI complied. HA YASHI stayed on 
in the Ministry， attached to its Secretariat， but was given no specific 
post and his wages were reduced by half. Eventually MORIGUCHI 
assumed the post of Deputy President of Daiei (Ranking No. 1 in the 
service industry)， whereas HAYASHI took up the post of Deputy Presi-
dent of ]asco (Ranking No. 4 in the service industry). The above case 
indicates nonetheless the psychic insecurity: the high-ranking officials 
who reach a position such as that of Vice-Minister or Bureau Chief 
while sti1l in their early fifties have to search for post-retirement 
jobs outside the bureaucracy.l0 
If one compares the employment situation of the retired ‘National-
ists' and ‘Internationalists' of MITI， the latter clearly have done better. 
In the case of守， probably， by reason of his right-hand man's sudden 
death and his own uncompromising personality， he could not secure an 
appropriate post-retirement job， and therefore he set up the Sahashi 
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Economic Research Institute by himself. He then took up the direc-
torship of an obscure organization called the Japan Leisure Centre. 
Since some of the senior ‘Nationalists' occupy posts in certain few steel 
firms-such as TOKUNAGA (Deputy President of Japan Steel Corpo-
ration) and MATSUO (Chairman of Nippon Kokan K. K.)，‘C' found a 
position in Kawasaki steel corporation as its Deputy President， and ‘Y' 
in Nippon Kokan K. K. as its Managing Director. The rest of the 
‘Nationalists' were resigned to taking up secondary posts although in 
quite good companies. The retired Vice-Ministers of the ‘International-
ists' are dispersed into a number of industries. For instance，‘S' 's 
chief rival ‘l' occupies the post of President of Nippon Oi1 Chemical 
Company. To follow the rest in succession order，‘M' is Deputy Presi-
dent of Toyota Motor Company;‘Z' who changed his loyalty later to 
the ‘Internationalists' is President of the Electricity Development 
Corporation (this is one of the two public corporations attached to 
MITI); 'J' is President of Arabian Oi1 Company; Y AMASHIT A is 
Managing Director of Mitsui Company; KOMATSU is Managing Director 
of Kobe Steel Company; and W ADA is adviser to the Industrial Bank 
of Japan. (Being adviser to one of the leading ]apanese banks is one 
of the stopgap posts， since higher -level officials are not permi tted to 
assume post司retirementjobs in private companies within two years 
after retirement. WADA took up the position of his predecessor， 
KOMATSU， who was until recently adviser to this bank.) 
The pattern of recruitment， advancement and post-retirement jobs 
described above thus provides abundant evidence of clientelist behaviour. 
Exploiting such institutional resources as the formal functions of the 
Secretariat， the clientelist group can chart out a pattern to the advan-
tage of its members. Such a pattern is not， however， immune to the 
danger of destruction by unexpected factors as is shown in ‘S' 's case. 
In the Soviet party-state bureaucracy patterns of recruitment and 
advancement have been far less routinized than in the Japanese case. 
Nonetheless， certain tendencies of routinization have been observable 
at al periods， albeit changing with changes in the top leadership regime. 
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As to recruitment， to take an example on a regional (obkom) level， 
two types of criteria seem to operate in the recruitment of its first 
secretary. First， recruitment of a regional first secretary may be in-
fluenced by the candidate's practical-administrative background， accord-
ing to the requirements of a particular region. The reassignment of 
a regional secretary to a comparable policy position may operate not 
only on a lateral level， i.e. from region to region， but also vertically， 
i. e. from region to centre.1 1n the case of lateral reassignment， the 
transfers sometimes seem to make for purposes of troubleshooting， i. 
e. a more experienced secretary is sent from a more developed region 
to strengthen the leadership of a less developed region that may be in 
serious trouble economically.12 A would -be first secretary might also 
be required to have experience in various types of work. According 
to some observers， men with both specialist and managerial experience， 
i. e. economically competent generalists， became， under the Brezhnev 
leadership， a more important consideration in promotions than either 
patronage or recent economic performance.13 Secondly， there is the 
criterion of a formal succession of posts， e.g. under the Brezhnev 
regime， the majority of new first secretaries have been recruited from 
the 2nd secretaries of the obkom or the chairmen of the soviet ex-
ecutive committees of the same region，14 whereas under the Khrushchev 
regime， many first secretaries were recruited from outside the region. 
By routinizing recruitment in this way， the Brezhnev regime may have 
indeed intended to maintain a delicate balance among contending groups. 
The application of such objective criteria may be intended to reduce 
the political element in such appointments， although it is by no means 
certain that it has succeeded in doing so. 
As for patterns of advancement from the obkom first secretary 
position， again partial regularities are observable: a republican (except 
RSFSR) regional first secretary may be advanced to a republican party 
or government post. An Ukrainian regional first secretary may， however， 
be advanced to an Ukrainian party or government post， or， ifhe is 
fortunate， advanced directly to be a RSFSR regional first secretary 
(15) 
275 
(although rare at present， this happened with several Khrushchev prot・
eges in the 1950s). The first secretary of the Ukrainan or Belorussian 
party may be advanced directly to a higher party or government post 
at the centre. A RSFSR regional first secretary may have an oppor-
tunity to advance directly to a higher party or government post at the 
centre. It should be noted that there exists a hierarchy among the 
republics and among the regions，15 of course a senior party post usually 
carries superior status to a senior government post on the same ad・
ministrative leve1. Most advancements are those of sideslips like those 
in the Japanese government bureaucracy. 
One could yet assume that promotion in the Soviet Union is deter-
mined not only by such objective criteria as performance， career back-
ground or seniority， but also by political consideration. There may 
exist career advancement by two kinds of political consideration. 
The first kind may be indicative of the efforts shown by the post-
Khrushchev oligarchs to establish legitimate rules for career advance-
ment. To maintain a delicate balance of power， indeed， the Brezhnev 
regime needs to distribute rewards， such as promotions， insome relat-
ionship to the strength of groups within the ruling coalitions.16 More-
over， the Brezhnev regime may have been careful not to unnecessari1y 
antagonize those who had lost in the inter-group struggles. We learn 
from Wil1erton's analysis that about 47 per cent of the c1ients of 
demoted patrons have retained their Central Commi ttee membership.17 
A number of c1ients of demoted patrons have thus been compensated 
with appointments and opportunities. In the巴arlyBrezhn巴v-Kosygin
period， Brezhnev may have wanted to establish what Car1 Lande terms 
a‘personal alliance system'. Lande distinguishes between ‘traditional' 
dyadic relationships with vertical links and ‘modern' relationships with 
horizontal links. In the latter relationships， the central individual has 
status， resources， or power roughly equal to those of his several 
partners.18 The Brezhnev regime may be better characterised as a 
coalition of several complex vertical dyadic alliances. The findings 
presented by Joel Moses indicate， however， that Brezhnev had indeed 
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cultivated former re1ationships as well， i. e. fostered politica1 advance-
ment by patronage. Joe1 Moses claims that about 75 per cent of 
Dnepropetrovsk ‘cohorts' (Brezhnev's) as against on1y about 18 per cent 
of the L'vov and KI鳩山ov‘cohorts'(Podgorny's) have been ab1e to 
advance beyond the Ukraine to receive career assignments in other 
republics or at federa11evel.19 John Willerton a1so observed a positve 
pattern between the advancements of Brezhnev and his clients.20 ln 
other words， the advancement of Brezhnev's clients， particu1ar1y since 
1964， has not been constrained so much by the aforementioned objective 
criteria. 
The crucia1 question here is， who is to determine and recommend 
the advancement of officia1s. A key to the building of a power base 
in the Soviet Union may stil be to have contro1 over the personne1 
selection. At one time， Podgorny was able to place his Kharkov subord・-
inate， V. N. Titov， as the junior Centra1 Committee secretary in charge 
of organizationa1 party work (equiva1ent to the Director of the Sec-
reta:riat in the Japanese government bureaucracy) and a1so another 
Kharkov subordinate， N. A. Sobo1 as second secretary of the Ukrainian 
CentraI Committee (the secretary in charge of personneI selection in 
that repubIic). They were， however， removed from contro1 over 
personnel se1ection before Podgorny cou1d materiaIize his own power 
base through that channel. ln the early post-Khrushchev period 
(1966)， Brezhnev made a major advance by transferring his old second 
secretary in Zaporozhe (and his successor in Dnepropetrovsk)， A. P. 
Kirile叫w，to the responsibilities of genera1 supervision over personne1 
se1ection and a1so of the urban economy that Podgorny had relinquished. 
Within the framework of routinized advancement， Brezhnev gradually 
succeeded in moving his proteges from Dnepropetrovsk， Zaporozhe and 
Mo1davia into key politica1 postS.21 lndeed， the growing inf1uence of 
Brezhnev by 1973 which is ref1ected in the doubling of Dnepropetrovsk 
‘cohorts' can be exp1ained either， as noted above， by their common 
Career association with a sing1e major politica1 patron (Brezhnev) or， 
as Joe1 Moses suggests， with a p1uraIity of patrons (assuming a coope-
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rative arrangement betw'een Brezhnev， KiriIenko and Shcherbitsky in 
the PolitburoY:2'3 Such a cooperative arrangement， like that of the 
Vice-Minister and the Director of the Sectetariat. in the Japanese 
Ministries， would be a key to establishing such a group's power base. 
In the Soviet Union， whether it is due to a temporary or a perma-
nent‘personal alliance system' in Brezhnev style， other Poli tburo mem-
bers than the Secretary，General and party Central Committee sec-
retaries appear to bring pressure for the selection of personnel from 
their territorial or policy domains. Jerry Hough points out， for in-
stance， that officials from Belorussian (Mazurov's region)， frOll Lenin-
grad (Kosygin's region)， and from Kharkov (Podgorny's region) have 
been much more successful than the average. The same is true of the 
top foreign policy officials (an area with which Suslov has been in-
volved， and the top industrial and construction officials (the atea of 
responsibility both of Kosygin as First Deputy Chairman of the Council 
of. Ministers and of Brezhnev as the Central Committee secretary for 
industry from 1956 to the summer of 1960).24 
Even under Stalin's reign， a second line of patrons seems to have 
enjoyed a certain latitude in the selection of lower political posts. N. 
S. Patolichev's recent memoirs reveal that his success and failure in 
career advancement was due in large part to the relative political 
power of his patron， Politburo member A. A. Andreyev. If Patolichev 
is to be believed， he owed his primary allegiance to Andreyev' rather 
than to Stalin， although the latter exercised ultimate authority over his 
career advancement. Even at Patolichev's level， he was allowed to 
recruit his own adherents as his subordinates.25 In the Soviet Union， 
the promotion of an official appears to be basically determined or 
recommended by his immediate superior， which would obviously invite 
the flourishing of vertical relationships. 
2) Policy. We have observed earlier that clientelism in the Japanese 
government bureaucracy linked with every aspect of the policy process. 
For instance， we saw that at a critical point 'S' brought his most able 
clients into the key positions in his office (Chief of the Enterprise 
(8) 
Political Clientelism in the USSR and Japan 272 
Bureau). In the Japanese government bureaucracy， it is usually the 
Vice -Minister or even more so， a Bureau Chief who launches policy 
initiatives leading to a new law or regulation with political ramifica-
tions and implications for the work of other Ministries. The ]apanese 
government bureaucracy， which is by and large a line organization， is
characterised by work-group solidarity within the ‘frame'， to use Chie 
Nakane's term. This office solidarity often renders cooperation difficult 
not only between Ministries， but also between Bureaus and Sections 
within a Ministry. To overcome such difficulties， there exist at least 
two institutional tools for arriving at a consensus. Ringi-sei， which 
is the process of obtaining consensus by circulating a draft plan within 
the Ministry concerned， isa formal internal consensus formation pro-
cess.26 Another institutional tool is an advisory committee drawn 
from business circles， academics， parliamentarians， and retired bureauc-
rats. Such a committee provides the Ministry with a forum well-
suited for preliminary consultation prior to formal Ministerial or inter-
Ministerial meetings. There is a high probability of obtaining a prel-
iminary consensus among the interested parties in this carefully mani-
pulated setting.27 Policy-makers can also use this forum to legitimize 
their draft bil1.28 The advisory committee system is a formal process 
for obtaining an external consensus. In addition， however， at some 
point the draft must be cleared with the appropriate division of the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Affair Research Council， and 
also at a meeting of the Vice-Minister and Bureau Chiefs of the Mini-
stry concerned， or a meeting of the Vice-Ministers of al of the Mini-
stries. To avoid open confrontation， the policy-makers in the burea-
ucracy usually engage in extensive informal consultations， mobilizing 
for this purpose their personal cliques and social networks， a process 
which overlaps with the aforementioned two formal consultation pro-
cesses. Nevertheless， there are occasions in which an open confronta-
tion does surface， providing a way， at least for one party， to gather 
together backing for a measure or a counter-measure. A recent 
example occurred with the plan by former Prime Minister FUKUDA 
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to set up a new Ministry of Energy Resources; the validity of this 
was openly challenged by the then Vice-Minister of MITI， WADA， who 
was in fear of losing administrative control over energy resource 
matters. Twenty days after this premeditated challenge， Prime Minister 
FUKUDA admitted that it was stil premature to carry out his plan. 
During these twenty days， the whole resources of the Ministry had 
been mobiIized to deal with the danger.29 First of al， the Bureau 
Chiefs met to discuss a strategy for countering FUKUDA's plan. Then， 
WADA personally approached the then Vice-Minister of the Ministry 
of Finance， KICHISE， for assistance; in view of the large financial 
implications of setting up a new Ministry， Ministry of Finance approval 
would obviously be acquired. KICHISE had been a contemporary of 
WADA in the accounting section of the old Japanese Imperial Navy， 
and the two may well have kept alive ever since a loose horizontal 
dyadic aIliance， in which one could count on the other's help in time 
of need.30 The Director and the section chiefs of the Secretariat， al 
trusted cIients of W ADA， played an active part in influencing the 
interested parties. At first， they appealed to other Ministries which 
were affected by FUKUDA's other administrative reform plans， to 
concert their efforts to counter these plans. Secondly， they approached 
the former Ministers of MITI， inparticular， MIKI and NAKASONE， 
now leaders of counter-mainstream factions in the Liberal Democratic 
Party. And， finally， they appealed to industrial and commercial circIes 
either directly or through social networks such as school ties and famiIy 
relations not to support FUKUDA's plan. The final outcome was a 
victory for WADA， who stayed on as Vice-Minister of MITI until his 
natural retirement from the office. 
Students of Soviet politics are divided on the question whether 
clientelism in the Soviet Union is closely related to the politics of the 
policy process. Jerry Hough， for example， appears to believe that 
Soviet factional activity is concerned almost entirely with the acquisi-
tion of position and has relatively litle policy content.41 First of al， 
he asserts， anti -faction rule makes the formation of any substantial 
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network of alliances a10ng philosophica1 lines among regiona1 and other 
midd1e-1eve1 officia1s difficu1t. Second1y， these midd1e司1eve1poli tica1 
officia1s refrain， inorder to avoid damaging their po1itica1 chances， 
from po1icy controversy or even a policy stance. And， third1y， the 
nature of censorship strengthens the tendency for policy re1evant al-
iances to remain compartmentalised within specialized ‘whir1poo1s' with 
se1ective censorship making it difficu1t to appea1 through the press for 
outside alies.32 Jerry Hough's negative estimate of the factiona1 
element in the policy process thus appears to be based on a view of 
midd1e-1eve1 officia1s as structurally and ideo1ogically restricted in 
their bahaviour. Joe1 Moses， on the other hand， points to the fact that 
Dnepropetrovsk ‘cohorts' have assumed a very wide range of policy 
responsibility and authority in such diverse institutions as the Ukrainian， 
Russian， and All-Union Counci1 of Ministers， the Komsomo1， economic 
p1anning organs， politica1 publishing houses， trade union counci1s， heavy 
industry and consumer sector ministries， the foreign ministry including 
the dip10matic corps， and the secret po1ice.33 Moses appears to assume， 
therefore， that the inf1uence of a major politica1 patron probab1y 
depends in some measure on his ability to mobilize as wide a base of 
politica1 support as possib1e for his policy initiatives in the Soviet 
bureaucracies. If the Soviet Union has moved toward the mode1 of 
'institutiona1 p1ura1ism' as Jerry Hough c1aims it has，34 it is imperative， 
on the part of a major patron， to protect his policy initiatives and his 
own politica1 position by p1acing as many 10ya1 subordinates as possib1e 
in a wide range of functiona1 and po1itica1 key positions. 
A1though we do not have direct evidence of a faction-dominated 
po1icy process， itseems reasonab1e to assume that factiona1 activity 
connected with efforts to establish a dominant position within the 
ruling oligarchy， inevitab1y takes on policy content. Khrushchev's Party 
bifurcation p1an in 1962， for examp1e， was ostensib1y designed to pro-
mote cadres with skills in technica1 and economic works. Armstrong 
considers， however， that the party bifurcation was directed against the 
agricu1tura1 regiona1 first secretaries.35 Another examp1e mentioned 
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by Carl Linden was Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign， which he used 
more than once to regain the offensive whenever he lost ground - as 
a means of keeping critics off balance， and to define the terms of 
political battle in his favour; 37 in the process of the anti-Stalinist 
campa国1，moreover， Khrushchev needed the support of the Leningrad 
party organization against the ‘group'， but in return， the Leningraders 
exacted a price for their aid in terms of expanded influence in the 
leadership.38 
In the process of policy implementation， clientage ‘networks' may 
give play to the initiating power of the patron. Robert Mi1ler points 
out that the Brezhnev regime has tried a number of territorially and 
functionally limited agricultural integration experiments， allowing local 
party officials considerable latitude in devising models tailored to local 
circumstances.39 His closer analysis of aglicul tural integration in the 
USSR shows that the most radical and comprehensive experiments have 
been carried on in Moldavia by Brezhnev's protegる1.1. Bodiul. It 
appears， inthis case， that one of Brezhnev's active clients， Bodiul， 
rendered strong commitment in the search for strategies of policy 
implementation， whereas Bodiul's patron， Brezhnev， protected Bodiul 
and his own position by silencing criticisms of the radical Moldavian 
approach to agricul tural reorganization.4 0 
The above evidence， albeit fragmented， shows that power politics 
among contending leaders certainly may take on policy content. Clien-
telist activity in this regard， however， takes varying approachs depending 
on the political circumstances of particular time， or the nature of 
particular regime， and or the kind of policy content. 
N on-junctional Motivation 
N. S. Patolichev is said to have had affective personal ties with 
A. A. Andreyev， Central Committee secretary under Stalin.41 As yet， 
however， there appear to be no serious studies of cultural factors 
which may impart an affective aspect to Soviet clientelist relations. 
A few students of Soviet politics who have studied Soviet clientelism 
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are inclined to link c1ientelism exc1usively or predominantly to institu-
tional， social and si tuational causation.4 2 
In ]apan， itis almost taken for granted that subordinates are tied 
personally， emotively and particularistically to the leader.4 3 Chie 
Nakane asserts that a group in which members are positioned hierar-
chically in a rigid pyramid operate within a common‘frame'， which 
may be a locality， an institution or a particular relationship that binds 
a set of individuals into one group. The institutional frame fulfils the 
important function of keeping the members together， whatever factions 
are found within it， and since members are classified primarily by the 
institution， whatever internal rivalries they may feel， they realize that 
they are al in one boat racing with another boat.44 Takeshi Ishida 
also asserts that a strong sense of identity with the organization and 
conformity to its goals is accompanied by a sense of competition both 
externally with other organizations and internally in loyalty to their 
own organization. The orientation of the members is not toward in-
dividual achievement but toward merit acquired by individual contribu-
tion to the goal of the organization. In this case，‘conformity' and 
‘competition' were not mutually opposed but rather mutually rein-
forcing.45 If we take such assertions (which sti1 need to be tested 
empirically) at face value， there seem to exist two kinds of loyalty: 
one to the organization and the other to the patron. However， the 
two kinds of loyalty appear to overlap one another， since c1ientelist 
activities are tied in with policy content within the organization. 
There may well be an occasion， nonetheless， when a c1ient values the 
integrity of the organization more than his status and gains within a 
c1ientelist group. He will thus limit informal group participation， or 
modify it so that it does not interfere with his formal position， or go 
over to another c1ientelist group whose objects are c10ser to the goal 
of the organization， as we saw in‘Z' 's case. Such behaviour is， how-
ever， extremely difficult to carry through. The relationship between 
the patron and the c1ient involves a mutual psychological or emotional 
dependence. The relationship binds not only the client; it also binds 
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the leader who， though he may often appear to be able to exercise a 
great deal of power， finds his authority checked and controlled at a 
great many points.4 6 The members of the clientelist group may share 
egalitarian sentiments， despite the fact that there exists official ranking 
and informal status within the group. Without such sentiments， there 
would not exist a feeling of shame or a sense of guilt for not returning 
favours to on巴'spatron or one's clients. A noted ]apanese psychologist， 
Takeo Doi， has conceptualized this notion as‘active dependency'.41 
The ]apanese， generally speaking， appear to be attached very strongly 
to abstract mores regarding the exchange of favours.48 The impor-
tance of reciprocating gratifications is internalized in the course of 
socialization process of the individual， so that he feels morally obliged 
to give benefits to those from whom he has received them. The im-
portant point is‘the norm of reciprocity'， asAlvin Gouldner terms it，49 
internalized not only by those in weaker positions but also by those 
who have the power to take， without giving anything in return. The 
relationship between the patron and the client is， indeed， emotionally 
and psychologically one of mutual dependence. Such a relationship is 
reinforced structurally in ]apanese organizations. The actual role of 
an individual in the organization does not always or necessarily corres-
pond to his rank or status assigned formally by the organization.5 0 
When the group is in action the roles of individual members are readily 
adjustable to changing situations: such as we saw in the relationship 
between the Vice-Minister and the Director of Secretariat， or between 
the Director and the section chiefs of the Secretariat. The lack of 
clear role differentiation in the organization makes it easier for subord司
inates to reciprocate favours on an equal footing， given the fact a 
subordinate often de facto carries out the work of his immediate 
superior， and so nurtures the clientelist formation. On the other hand， 
this offers the subordinate an opportunity to manoeuvre aga，inst his 
competing colleagues. 
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2. MEMBERSHIP OF THE CLIENTELIST GROUP 
Chie Nakane notes also that the oyabun-kobun (patron圃client)
relationship comes into being through one's occupational training and 
acitivities， and carries social and personal implications， appearing sym-
bolically at the critical moments in a man's life.51 She goes on to say， 
however， that the informal hierarchy and the factions which develop 
among a group's members (the invisible organization) overlap and 
supersede an institution's formal administrative (visible) organization.52 
Although this vertically-organized structure could well be ‘starting 
mechanismフ3through which individuals can initiate social interaction 
and develops into vertical dyadic alliances. As we observed already， 
the informal hierarchy does not fully correspond with the formal 
organizational hierarchy. 
There exist two kinds of informal group members: one consists 
of‘inner frame' members who are stil in active service in the Ministry， 
and the other of‘outer frame' members who are either retired officials 
taking up positions in a cluster of ‘colonies' or‘satelites' such as public 
corporations， or official clients of the Ministry such as private enter-
prises. Clientelism in the Japanese government bureaucracy， by and 
large， isformed gradually， as officials search for reliable and able (as 
the groups' activities are strongly oriented to policy contents) subordi-
nates in the process of the spiral promotion of the patron himself. 
Its members are thus made up of persons from a number of bureaus 
and sections. The reciprocating process in the Japanese system is a 
life-long process， even though， upon the retirement of the patron from 
the office， the roles of patron and client are reversed. The new 
patron who can command better resources and have access to the 
political processes is now in a position to return the favours he 
received from his original patron. If， for example， the latter now 
heads a public corporation， larger subsidies from the Ministry mean an 
increase in his corporation's sphere of influence， or at least in its 
prestige. Although dyadic relationships are a life-long process， the 
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structure of power relations in the informal group headed by the new 
patron may not be quite the same as that of the group headed by the 
original patron困 Withthe demise of the latter， no matter which one 
in the group succeeds， the group cannot maintain the same structure 
of membership with the new leader who has his own clients who are 
tied particularlistically to himself. The duration of the clientelist 
relationship is， strictly speaking， of only one generation: the working 
life of the patron. Stability of clientelist groups will aIso be affected 
by externaI factors such as changes in the structure of political leader-
ship. 
In the Soviet Union， factors such as insecurity and unpredictability 
of tenure， acquisition of power and， to a lesser extent， the policy 
process appear to contribute to clientelism. Many of the clientelist 
bonds in the Soviet politicaI system are largely formed during the 
patron's mid-career p巴riod，most likely around regional and republican 
secretaries. Joel Moses has presented evidence of a direct linkage 
between the political influence of a central patron and local ‘cohorts'.54 
As the avenues for career advancement at regional level have becom巴
institutionalized， albeit its future is not absolutely certain， itis certainly 
arguable now whether the r巴gionalfirst secretaries (mainly in the 
RSFSR) who link the higher levels with the lower ones may be inspired 
to form clientage networks in his own region. The inspiration may 
naturally vary depending on the personal motivations and ambitions of 
the individual regional first secretaries. Apart from the political 
advantages a regional first secretary has as being a regionaI boss， one 
should also note the peculiar institutional set-up within the Soviet 
political system. That is the lack of clear role differentiation between 
various organizations in each level: in particular， the overlapping 
system of party and government officials， together with the system 
of other controlling agencies. This bears some resemblance to the 
unclear role differentiation we have discussed in the Japanese govern-
ment bureaucracy， although the latter relates to vertical role differe-
ntiation， whereas the former relates to lateral role differentiation. 
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Such an institutional set-up may encourage a regional first secretary 
to assume the role of patron. The regional first secretaries， further-
more， may under certain circumstances establish horizontal alliances 
among the regional secretaries themselves， most likely in the form of 
alliances among the regional secretaries who share the same major 
patron (e. g. a senior Politburo member). H巴re，they are likely to 
alternate in roles of patron and client depending upon the situation in 
which the exchanges take place， despite the fact that there exists a 
hierarcy among the region.5 The aggregate of clientage links， there-
fore， might giv巴 aregional first s巴cretarya resource， as does his 
access to a senior Politburo member. 
However， itshould be noted， first， that the above descriptions are 
static views of clientage networks formed around regional party sec-
retaries. The patron-client relationship would develop and grow over 
time， as both individuals rise in the hierarchy.56 This time factor 
would greatly contribute， unless the patron himself were demoted in 
the meantime， to the formation of complex vertical dyadic a1iances 
and even coalitions of alliances. Secondly， although the groupings arise 
out of regional variations， its members， as the patron advances up the 
hierarchical ladder， wi1l be dispersed into diverse institutions cutting 
right across regional and organizational boundaries. As we noted earlier， 
the wider its members are dispersed， the better the clientelist group 
may work as a policy support system. 
The fate of the vertical dyadic alliances wi1l largely be determined 
by the rise and fal of the major patron. The way the patronage 
network is to maintain or to expand its membership varies according 
to the character of the regime， as we observed earlier in comparing 
the Brezhnev and Khrushchev regimes. Nevertheless， ifthe major 
patron were the General Secretary， he would be in a far better position 
to initiate broad political programmes directly or indirectly for the 
well-being of his proteges than his associates in the Politburo， who are 
largely limited to counteractions. If the other associates in the Polit-
buro perceived a threat both to their own career and to the stability 
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of origarchic rule， they might attempt to topple the General Secretary， 
as happened to Khrushchev twice during his reign. Power relations of 
the vertical dyadic a1iances under a new major patron wi1 in most 
cases differ from those of the former alliances， as do those in the 
]apanese government bureaucracy. Moreover， ifthe current policy of 
‘stability of cadres' continued， a new major patron might find even 
more difficult to break up other rival patrons' regional ‘networks'. 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In ]apan， personal cliques are generally regarded as social evil. In 
the Soviet Union， likewise， factionalism is much discussed as running 
counter to the ideological interest. 
Albert Craig， however， recognizes the positive functions of burea-
ucratic cliques in ]apanese government bureaucracy as follows: 
One is to bypass an occasional blockage up-and-down the organi-
zation by forming a conduit for communications outside of channels. 
Another important function is lateral communication with a high level 
of trust. The coordination of work on a horizontal axis is often 
difficult within ]apanese bureaucracy since vertical ties are so impo-
rtant that they always take precendence. But if the chief of one 
bureau was formerly the section chief in another bureau， he may well 
know its present section chief and will certainly know some of its 
permanent lower officials. This may enable him to reach them directly 
without going through the other bureau chief， especially if he is close 
to the present chief. His effectiveness as a bureaucrat depends in 
some measure on the cultivation of such personal ties.... Personal 
cliques are limited to the confines of a single ministry since officials 
are not transferred from one ministry to anothr. Consequently personal 
cliques are of no use in coordinating work between ministries... If 
an acquaintance from the same class at Tokyo University is in another 
ministry， a short telephone cal may accomplish what would take days 
or weeks... . In a variety of ways， the informal system within the 
bureaucracy complements and is necessary to the formal system.5 7 
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Thus， Craig attaches a particular importance to the communication 
function of c1ientelism within the Ministry and with other Ministries 
in the course of policy-making and policy implementation. We have 
also observed that its career mobility function goes beyond the bound-
aries of the government bureaucracy. Through c1ientage networks， 
interests may be aggregated and articulated at different levels. One 
of the singularities of ]apanese c1ientage is that its activities are so 
c10sely related to every aspect of the policy process. If one focuses 
on each aspect of clientage separately， one misses its dynamic element， 
that is， that patron-c1ient networks expand the bureaucracy's capacity 
in policy innovation， hence enhance the Bureaucracy's adaptability to 
its changing environment. Rapid turnover of office holders and rout-
inization of recruitment and advancement are very much in gear with 
the positive functions of the political c1ientage. By imparting to the 
Secretariat (in charge of personnel and organizational matters) such a 
crucial role in each Ministry， political c1ientage in the government 
bureaucracy is not only tolerated but also structurally maintained to 
perform its positive functions which are hidden under the formal in-
stitutional set-up. 
1n the Soviet Union， as indicated in the preceding sections， the 
participants in the chain of c1ientelist relationships appeared to treat 
political clientage as one of several possible al ternatives to further 
career perspectives and to acquire political power. Clientage networks 
may also be mobilized for support of the patron at a critical moment 
such as a succession crisis. It is not c1ear， however， whether the 
c1ientelist activities are c10sely related， as those of ]apanese c1ientage 
constantly are， tothe policy process.58 We have noted earlier， however， 
that vertical dyadic alliances are operating in every level of the entire 
Soviet political system. It would not be altogether impossible to 
assume that Brezhnev's‘cohorts'， for instance， might lend their support 
to their patron's policy initiatives. 1n the course of policy imple-
mentation， they might be more likely to cooperate with one another 
for the fulfilment of individual targets as suggested in relation to the 
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regional first secretaries and as observed in the agricultural integration 
experiment in Moldavia. 
Trends have been observed in the past simi1ar to those found in 
the ]apanese government bureaucracy， namely， to recruit competent 
generalists rather than specialists， to routinize advancement， to keep 
policy relevant alliances compartmentalized within specialized ‘whirl-
pools'， to use ]erry Hough's apt metaphor， (though， in the ]apanese 
government bureaucracy， this occurs in the offices of lower-level 
officials more than in those of higher-level officials)， and also to 
maintain unclear role differentiation. Despite such similar trends， the 
main areas of Soviet clientelist activities， judging by the available 
evidence， are centred on the pursuance of group members' career pers-
pectives and the acquisition of power. We have observed that the 
causation of clientelism operating within the ]apanese government 
bureaucracy and within the Soviet political system at large appears to 
be closely linked with political and functional motivations along with 
cultural factors. Yet， historically one of the strongest factors in the 
Soviet system contributing to a clientelist formation is evidently in-
security and unpredictability of tenure， whereas in ]apan this factor 
appears to be lacking but on the other hand clientelism appears to be 
grounded in the culturaIly deep-rooted particularistic behaviour of in-
dividuals. This difference in the origins of political clientelism might 
be expected to have consequences for its functions in the two countries. 
For the moment， however， as long as certain elements such as the 
length of service required for advancement in each level and the timing 
of retirement from office remains less formalized， the clientage net-
works may not be able to express their functions fully in the area of 
the policy process. Such a state of political clientage in the Soviet 
Union may indeed become an element of destabilization in the power 
structure of leadership， by offsetting its positive functions. 
From this analysis， we can conclude that political clientage， whi1e 
manifesting substantial differences in ]apan and the USSR， nevertheless 
operates as a systemic adjusting mechanism in both countries. 
(30) 
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